The paper presents two empirical cases of expert musicians—a classical string quartet and a solo, free improvisation saxophonist—to analyze the explanatory power and reach of theories in the field of expertise studies and joint action. We argue that neither the positions stressing top-down capacities of prediction, planning or perspective-taking, nor those emphasizing bottom-up embodied processes of entrainment, motor-responses and emotional sharing can do justice to the empirical material. We then turn to hybrid theories in the expertise debate and interactionist accounts (...) of cognition. Attempting to strengthen and extend them, we offer ‘Arch’: an overarching conception of musical interaction as an externalized, cognitive scaffold that encompasses high and low-level cognition, internal and external processes, as well as the shared normative space including the musical materials in which the musicians perform. In other words, ‘Arch’ proposes interaction as a multivariate multimodal overarching scaffold necessary to explain not only cases of joint performance, but equally of solo improvisation. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Special Issue: ‘The Roots of Normativity. Developmental, Comparative and Conceptual issues’. The contributions collected in this volume aim to present a picture of contemporary accounts of normativity that integrate philosophy and developmental and comparative psychology and purport to provide the reader with new insights regarding a classical debate about what makes us human: being governed by norms and being able to orient ourselves in the light of them. This introduction presents a broad picture of the issues (...) at the heart of traditional discussions on normativity and lays out a set of conditions which a proper account of normativity should meet. In so doing the main common themes that unify these papers are brought to the fore. In particular, all of them share the idea that human-specific norms are themselves social. Once questions concerning the evolution of normative capacities and their development are considered, however, they pose - so it is argued - specific challenges to an account of normativity. While the traditional approaches fail to face such challenges, it is the main aim of the papers in this Special Issue to meet them. In concluding, a brief overview of each paper is provided. (shrink)

Brandom is one of the main advocators of the idea that meaning is instituted within basic linguistic practices through mutual exchanges. The aim of this paper is to show that such framework cannot do the required job if the dynamics of mutual exchanges is understood in interpretational terms. After arguing that the interpretational framework does not work, the paper presents an alternative second-personal conversational model capable of meeting the challenge.

Even if it appears quite evident that we live within society and as a consequence are bound together by shared norms and institutions, the nature of this relationship is a source of philosophical perplexity. After discussing the conditions of adequacy a conception of shared norms must accommodate, I discuss communitarian and interpretationist accounts of shared norms. I claim that they are problematic insofar as they fail to provide an adequate conception of the shared and binding character of social norms. Finally, (...) I argue that a different understanding of the shared character of norms follows from a correct understanding of the conditions of adequacy at stake. (shrink)

Enactivists claim that social cognition is constituted by interactive processes and even more radically that there is ‘no observation without interaction’. Nevertheless, the notion of interaction at the core of the account has not yet being characterized in a way that makes good the claim that interactions actually constitute social understanding rather than merely facilitating or causally contributing to it. This paper seeks to complement the enactivist approach by offering an account of basic joint action that involves and brings with (...) it basic forms of mental understanding. The paper turns to theories of joint action rather than theories of perception as some enactivists have done :535–543, 2008; Thompson in J Conscious Stud 8:1–32, 2001), to gain insight into the kind of interactions that underpin our understanding of other minds, and in that way, supplement the interactionist-enactive account. In line with Enactivism, the paper argues that this kind of social understanding is practical rather than theoretical and that it is cognitively more basic and developmentally prior when compared to other ways we come to understand other minds. (shrink)

Mi objetivo en este artículo es analizar el alcance de las argumentaciones kripkensteinianas acerca de las reglas. Mi estrategia argumentativa será la siguiente: en primer lugar presentaré el argumento de Kripke y luego la objeción de Soames a este argumento: hay dos sentidos posibles en los que se utiliza el término “determinar”, como determinación epistémica y como determinación metafísica. Según Soames, esta distinción nos permite sostener, en contra de Kripke, que hay hechos que determinan metafísicamente el significado, aún si no (...) hay una determinación epistémica de los mismos. Objetaré esta salida al argumento cuestionando el postular una determinación metafísica que deja en un misterio las cuestiones epistémicas relativas a la semántica. Son precisamente estos rasgos los que el escéptico nos pide que expliquemos. Por lo tanto a continuación expongo una serie de alternativas que, asociadas con una posición metafísica, intentan dar cuenta del factor epistémico propio de la semántica. Argumentaré que todas estas alternativas, al postular hechos, dejan inexplicado dicho factor. De este modo intentaré mostrar que el resultado escéptico de la reflexión kripkensteiniana sigue en pie, ninguna teoría semántica que postule hechos para dar cuenta del factor epistémico, indisolublemente ligado a la conducta verbal, puede efectivamente hacerlo. (shrink)

Este trabajo esboza una forma de justificar el principio estructurador central de una teoría veritista de la evaluación epistémica, en respuesta a críticas planteadas por Eleonora Cresto a mi defensa del veritismo frente a una serie de objeciones en el sentido de que no es capaz de explicar la naturaleza y el valor del entendimiento. La primera sección presenta el esbozo de justificación del núcleo de una teoría veritista; la segunda responde a críticas más específicas de Cresto. This paper sketches (...) a way to justify the central tenet of a veritistic theory of epistemic evaluation, in response to problems raised by Eleonora Cresto concerning my defense of veritism, against a series of objetions to the effect that veritistic epistemology is uncapable of explaining the nature and value of understanding. The first section presents the sketch of justification of the nucleus of a veritistic theory, the second responds to some of Cresto's more specific criticisms. (shrink)

This paper introduces the special issue 'The point of view of shared agency', a collection of papers that develops, and critically assesses, a striking development in recent philosophy of mind, epistemology, and developmental psychology, that is, the fundamental reappraisal of the time-honoured distinction between a ‘first-person' and a ‘third-person perspective' on our mental lives. In recent years, the nature of the ‘second-person standpoint' has become a major focus of work across a range of disciplines. More recently, the idea of ‘first-person (...) plural knowledge', has received some attention, for example in considering knowledge of what ‘we are doing’ when we are doing things together. This collection explores collective agency, self-knowledge, and knowledge of other minds, from this plural and relational point of view. (shrink)

Este trabajo explora las críticas de McDowell a la argumentación de Kripke en Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language y analiza su propuesta positiva, el ofrecimiento de un hecho semántico primitivo. Su idea es que el resultado escéptico alcanzado por Kripke resulta de no haber desechado la identificación entre significado e interpretación. Al contrario, el marco para dar cuenta de la noción de significado es la práctica: los hechos semánticos primitivos -elaborables a través de una semántica de condiciones de verdad- (...) son constituidos en la práctica comunitaria, y de ellos tenemos una captación individual. En mi opinión no sólo la crítica de McDowell a Kripke es errada, sino que su propuesta positiva presenta problemas fundamentales, tanto en su concepción de la normatividad como en sus aspectos epistémicos. El corolario de este trabajo será mostrar que el verdadero problema para una teoría semántica es la identificación del significado con cualquier tipo de hecho y no meramente la identificación del significado con la interpretación. This paper explores McDowell's criticisms to Kripke's argumentation in his Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, and analyses his positive proposal, that is, the offering of a primitive semantic fact. His idea is that the skeptical result reached by Kripke depends on not having discarded the identification between meaning and interpretation. On the contrary, the ITamework to explain the notion of meaning is the practice: the primitive semantic facts - that may be established by truth-values semantics - are constituted by the communitarian practice, and we get an individual insight of them. In my view, not only the criticism of McDowell to Kripke is erroneous, but also his positive proposal presents fundamental problems, in his conception ofnormativity as well as in his epistemic aspects. The conclusion of this paper will be to show how the real problem for a semantic theory is the identification ofmeaning with any kind of fact and not only the identification of meaning and interpretation. (shrink)

The publication of the revised edition of Place and Experience provides the occasion to discuss Malpas’ original account of place, and its role in a proper account of the central features of human minds. The first edition is a groundbreaking work on the embodiment and embeddedness of human minds, that prefigures more recent developments of a now established field of research on embodied minds: so-called E accounts. In this paper, I address three issues in Malpas’ book that I found problematic (...) at times and unclear at others, and argue that E- accounts, or better, a particular rendering of them, can better dissolve. These interrelated issues are: 1. the use of the idea of mental representations to understand location and orientation; 2. the claim that non-human animals have ‘environments’ but lack ‘worlds’, 3. the use of two exclusive vocabularies, the physical and the mental, for describing cognition. I thus question such ideas, associated with traditional accounts of cognition, which not only are responsible for some of the gravest criticisms such accounts have received, but seem inadequate to Malpas’ characterization of minds as placed. My recommendation is to take a step back from the traditional framework, and allow ourselves to simply move forward. (shrink)

En este texto se argumenta que la noción de interpretación desarrollada por Alberto Moretti en “La unidad proposicional” presenta algunos problemas filosóficos y metafilosóficos. Después de presentar las ideas centrales de la práctica interpretativa que defiende Moretti, se cuestionan en particular su incompatibilidad con un tratamiento naturalista de las capacidades de hablar e interpretar, que las entiende como capacidades naturales con historias filo y ontogenéticas, y el hecho de que se compromete con una posición inefabilista acerca de los fundamentos de (...) dicha práctica. Se argumenta que el abandono de la idea de que las capacidades intencionales siempre presuponen la manipulación de contenidos conceptuales, como postula la estrategia interpretativa, abre las puertas para un naturalismo acerca de las capacidades de hablar, nombrar e interpretar. Este naturalismo es además, pluralista respecto de los rasgos necesarios y/o suficientes que hacen de una práctica una práctica lingüística, y no inefabilista acerca de su fundamento. (shrink)

We review the current state of play in the game of naturalizing content and analyse reasons why each of the main proposals, when taken in isolation, is unsatisfactory. Our diagnosis is that if there is to be progress two fundamental changes are necessary. First, the point of the game needs to be reconceived in terms of explaining the natural origins of content. Second, the pivotal assumption that intentionality is always and everywhere contentful must be abandoned. Reviving and updating Haugeland’s baseball (...) analogy in the light of these changes, we propose ways of redirecting the efforts of players on each base of his intentionality All-Star team, enabling them to start functioning effectively as a team. Only then is it likely that they will finally get their innings and maybe, just maybe, even win the game. (shrink)

This paper explicates Wittgenstein's vision of our place in nature and shows in what ways it is unlike and more fruitful than the picture of nature promoted by exclusive scientific naturalists. Wittgenstein's vision of nature is bound up with and supports his signature view that the task of philosophy is distinctively descriptive rather than explanatory. Highlighting what makes Wittgenstein's vision of nature special, it has been claimed that to the extent that he qualifies as a naturalist of any sort he (...) ought to be regarded as a liberal naturalist. We argue, in contrast, that focusing solely on the liberality of Wittgenstein's view of nature risks overlooking and downplaying the ways in which his philosophical clarifications can act as a platform for productively engaging with the sciences in their explanatory endeavors. We argue that Wittgenstein's vision of nature allows for a more relaxed form of naturalism in which philosophy can be a productive partner for scientific inquiry and investigation. Although this feature of Wittgenstein's vision of nature is not something that he himself emphasized, given his interests and concerns, it is an inspiring vision in an age in which philosophy must find its feet with and alongside the sciences. (shrink)

This paper introduces this special issue which is focused on its target paper - The Natural Origins of Content. The target paper has had a robust and considered set of fifteen replies; a literal A to Z of papers. This extended introduction explains the background thinking and challenges that motivated the target article's proposed research programme. It also provides a sneak peak preview and navigational aid to the special issue’s contents. Brief highlights of each commentary are provided and they are (...) grouped together under broad headings. We do not attempt to give detailed replies to these suggestions or answer the various critiques at this stage of the proceedings: that is for future work. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Daniel D. Hutto and Glenda Satne expose, and suggest a way to resolve, what they see as an “essential tension” which has plagued what they take to be the most promising approach to the nature of contentful states, that is, the neo-pragmatist approach. According to this approach, an adequate account of content essentially appeals to the notion of a social practice. This paper is a critical assessment of their proposal. On their view, the tension stems from the fact (...) that participation in a social practice seems to require that, in order to participate in one, an individual must have contentful states. This entails that participation in social practices cannot explain the origin of contentful states. They argue that the tension dissipates once contentless forms of intentionality come into view. I show that the tension cannot be addressed in the way in which they suggest, for the intermediate steps between primitive intentionality and contentful intentionality cannot in fact fully be accounted for. Nevertheless, Hutto and Satne shed valuable light on the location and scope of the gap in the transition between mindlessness and contentful mindedness. (shrink)

Diego Bubbio, Ingo Farin and Glenda Satne have advanced a range of comments, questions and challenges relating to the ideas and arguments set out in the new edition of my Place and Experience (2018). Rather than address each of my interlocutors separately, my responses here are organized around four main topics: the relation between space and place, including the nature of space; the relation between place and subjectivity, and the foundational role of place; the relation between place and (...) conceptuality; and the relation between place and normativity. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the extent to which Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Stance Theory fits into the overall proposal for a programme on naturalizing mental content outlined by Daniel Hutto and Glenda Satne in this issue. I argue that in order to fit the proposal, two changes need to be made: the reality of intentional states should not be grounded in the reality of behavioral patterns but in the ascription-independent status of Ur-intentionality that is the at the root (...) of all intentionality, including content-involving intentonality. This is tricky since Ur-intentionality resembles ‘original intentionality’, which is a notion Dennett rejects, and the ascription-dependent status of content-involving intentionality should be kept intact. adopting the intentional stance is possible only as part of socio-cultural practices, which implies that this is an exclusively human capacity. I also argue that both changes to the theory are feasible and should be considered improvements relative to the original position developed by Dennett. (shrink)

Reviewing the state of play in the attempt to naturalise content a quarter of a century after John Haugeland’s survey paper “The Intentionality All-Stars”, Dan Hutto and Glenda Satne propose a new naturalistic account of content that supposedly synthesizes what is best in the three failed programs of neo-Cartesianism, neo-Behaviourism and neo-Pragmatism. They propose to appeal to a Relaxed Naturalism, a non-reductive genealogical form of explanation and a primitive notion of contentless ur-intentionality. In this paper I argue that (...) the authors’ Relaxed Naturalism is a broad form of Scientific Naturalism and, as such, it is unable to account for the problem of conceptual normativity that arises for any scientific naturalist attempt to explain content – whether reductive or not. This is based on the irreconcilability of the objective third-personal character of scientific inquiry and the intersubjective second-personal nature of the normativity of content. I suggest that the authors would do better to simply become neo-Pragmatists who, properly understood, are Liberal Naturalists who have the conceptual and methodological resources to acknowledge and do justice to conceptually normative content. (shrink)

Forgiveness is clearly an important aspect of our moral lives, yet surprisingly Kant, one of the most important authors in the history of Western ethics, seems to have very little to say about it. Some authors explain this omission by noting that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought: forgiveness seems to have an ineluctably ‘elective’ aspect which makes it to a certain extent arbitrary; thus it stands in tension with Kant’s claim that agents are autonomous beings, capable of determining (...) their own moral status through rational reflection and choice. Other authors recognise that forgiveness plays a role in Kant’s philosophy but fail to appreciate the nature of this duty and misrepresent the Kantian argument in support of it. This paper argues that there is space in Kant’s philosophy for a genuine theory of forgiveness and hopes to lay the grounds for a correct interpretation of this theory. I argue that from a Kantian perspective, forgiveness is not ‘elective’ but, at least in some cases, morally required. I claim that, for Kant, we have an imperfect duty of virtue to forgive repentant wrongdoers that have embarked on a project of self-reflection and self-reform. I develop a novel argument in support of this duty by drawing on Kant’s theory of rational agency, the thesis of radical evil, Kant’s theory of moral development, and the formula of humanity. However, it must be noted that this is a conditional duty and Kant’s position also entails that absence of repentance on the part of the wrongdoer should be taken as evidence of a lack of commitment to a project of self-reflection and self-reform. In such cases, Kant claims, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to forgive unrepentant wrongdoers. I argue that this duty should be understood as one of the duties of self-esteem, which involves the duty to respect and recognise our own dignity as rational beings. (shrink)

En este artículo, ofreceremos algunas reflexiones sobre la historia en la obra de Hannah Arendt partiendo de la premisa de que esta se asienta en su concepto de acción. Con tal fin, recurriremos a distintos textos en los que la autora alemana discutió nociones cruciales para su definición de la condición humana, a saber, las tres actividades bajo las cuales se le dio vida al hombre en la Tierra –labor, trabajo y acción– y la separación entre lo público y lo (...) privado. Nuestro vínculo con el pasado y su relación tanto con el presente como con el futuro estarán también en el centro del recorrido que aquí proponemos. (shrink)

In this article we offer a single case study using an action research method for gathering and analysing data offering insights valuable to both design and research supervision practice. We do not attempt to generalise from this single case, but offer it as an instance that can improve our understanding of research supervision practice. We question the conventional ‘dyadic’ models of research supervision and outline a more collaborative model, based on the signature pedagogy of architecture: the design studio. A novel (...) approach to the supervision of creatively oriented postgraduate students is proposed, including new approaches to design methods and participatory supervision that draw on established design studio practices. This model collapses the distance between design and research activities. Our case study involving Master's Research Students supervision in the discipline of Architecture, shows how ‘connected learning’ emerges from this approach. This type of learning builds strong elements of creativity and fun, which promote and enhance student engagement. The results of our action research suggest that students learn to research more easily in such an environment and supervisory practices are enhanced when we apply the techniques and characteristics of design studio pedagogy to the more conventional research pedagogies imported from the humanities. We believe that other creative disciplines can apply similar tactics to enrich both the creative practice of research and the supervision of HDR students. (shrink)

Constructing a dialogue between the social theory of Alain Touraine and the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, this work locates the wellsprings of the renewed intepretative powers of Touraine's recent sociology of the subject and critique of modernity in an implicit and unfinished, but unmistakable 'hermeneutical turn'.

Abstract The introduction of genetically modified plants into the environment has been marked by different positions, either in favor of or against their release. However, the problem goes well beyond such contradictory positions; it is necessary to take into account the legislation, ethics, biosafety, and the environment in the considerations related to the release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). To this end, the Brazilian Committee of Biosafety (CTNBio), a consultative and deliberative multidisciplinary collegiate, provides technical and advisory support to the (...) Brazilian Federal Government. This committee consists of scientists and non-scientists who participate in evaluating the dossiers of companies that are requesting approval by the Brazilian Government; consequently, the aim of this study was to investigate whether commercial approvals of GMOs were associated with the profile of the CTNBio members. Research was based on the minutes taken at CTNBio meetings carried out from 2006 up to 2009, considering law 11.105/2005 and the Constitution of 1988 as legal frameworks, to determine the number of voters in favor of or against releasing genetically modified Bt-maize, Bt-cotton, and herbicide resistant soybeans to be used in Brazilian agriculture. Via the internet, we had access to the curriculum vitae of the CTNBio members through the Plataforma Lattes database of the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), where we found their area of expertise. CTNBio members were divided into expert-for, expert-against, non-expert-for, and non-expert-against. Results showed that CTNBio decisions could be based on technical criteria as well as on the policy of the institution that expert-members were representing. Content Type Journal Article Category Articles Pages 1-11 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9347-x Authors Glenda Morais Rocha Braña, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Bioética da Cátedra/UNESCO, Faculdade de Ciências da Saúde, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, DF, Brazil Ana Luisa Miranda-Vilela, Departamento de Genética e Morfologia, Laboratório de Genética Toxicológica, Instituto de Ciências Biológicas, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, DF, Brazil Cesar Koppe Grisolia, Departamento de Genética e Morfologia, Laboratório de Genética Toxicológica, Instituto de Ciências Biológicas, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, DF, Brazil Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863. (shrink)

Since the inception of the Pastoral Care Movement, the approach to pastoral care has evolved from the traditional shepherd model to a more clinical, client-centred method. This evolution requires a thorough analysis of recent trends and dynamics in pastoral care, especially in relation to key theological theories and the Church’s role in providing support. Today, the landscape of pastoral care covers a range of topics, including ecotheology, global existential crises and the Church’s involvement in addressing these issues. Additionally, this examination (...) reveals conclusions about theological shortcomings and inconsistencies in emphasis within pastoral care.Contribution: This article provides a critical overview of pastoral care in its current form and context, examining its relevance to the existential needs of the postmodern social milieu and its role in the church today. It offers a critical evaluation of pastoral care within contemporary culture. (shrink)

Se presenta una experiencia de formación docente implementada en contexto de innovación curricular, proceso desarrollado a nivel nacional en las instituciones del Consejo de Rectores de Universidades de Chile (CRUCH). Esta experiencia, se realizó durante el año 2017, con la implementación de la Capacitación “Metodologías Activas Para el Desarrollo de Competencias”, del Centro de Mejoramiento Docente de la Universidad de Atacama, y tuvo como principal objetivo, determinar el grado de contribución a la implementación del proceso enseñanza – aprendizaje, desde la (...) percepción de docentes y directivos, de las carreras de Pedagogías de la Facultad de Humanidades y Educación, de la UDA. (shrink)

Cultivated by Hand aligns the overlooked history of amateur musicians in the early years of the United States with little-understood practices of music book making. It reveals the pervasiveness of these practices, particularly among women, and their importance for the construction of gender, class, race, and nation.

Brazil is the biggest market for pesticides in the world. In the registration process, a pesticide must be authorized by the Institute of the Environment, Health Surveillance Agency and Ministry of Agriculture. Evaluations follow a package of toxicological studies submitted by the companies and also based on the Brazilian law regarding pesticides. We confronted data produced by private laboratories, submitted to the Institute of the Environment for registration, with data obtained from scientific databases, corresponding to mutagenicity, carcinogenicity and teratogenicity of (...) pesticides. All studies submitted by the companies were carried out by private laboratories. From 247 pesticide formulations analyzed, none showed positive results for mutagenicity, carcinogenicity or teratogenicity. From 574 articles in the scientific literature, 84% published by public laboratories showed positive results, while 79% of those showing negative results came from private laboratories. There is an ethical concern about a conflict of interest between public/independent laboratories and private laboratories that produce data for registering pesticides. We demonstrated that there is a clear contradiction between public and private laboratories. Brazilian regulatory authorities have approved the registration of pesticides based almost exclusively on the monographs provided by the pesticide industry, because the use of scientific articles or information from the independent literature is strongly belittled by the industry. Pesticide companies argue that scientific articles cannot be trusted. Also, according to the industry, pesticide registration cannot be refused based on results from scientific articles. Thus, the registration of pesticides with mutagenic, carcinogenic and teratogenic risks has been approved in Brazil. (shrink)

Este volumen presenta la primera recopilación sistemática de diálogos y discusiones que especialistas hispanohablantes en el pensamiento de Immanuel Kant mantienen desde hace años con la dilatada obra de la Profesora Emérita de la Universidad de Cambridge, Onora O´Neill, Baronesa de Bengarve. Las contribuciones de destacados estudiosos de Argentina, México y España se centran en la actualización de la racionalidad práctica kantiana por parte de O´Neill, con especial atención a la interpretación del contractualismo, las condiciones de la justicia, la construcción (...) del espacio público, la fundamentación de los derechos humanos y la lógica de la autoconfianza en la acción, sin la que la autonomía quedaría carente de una base sólida. La Profesora O´Neill ha redactado un texto expreso para presentar los trabajos reunidos en el volumen, en el que realiza un balance de su amplio itinerario intelectual, señalando algunos hitos en torno a los que se articulan los capítulos. Las editoras confían en que esta publicación resulte del interés del público especializado en la discusión contemporánea sobre el pensamiento práctico de Kant, tomando como guía en esta ocasión a una de sus intérpretes actuales más prestigiosas. (shrink)

At the turn of the twenty-first century, historical studies of internationalism--above and beyond the call to the workers of the world to unite--have become the norm in a relatively short space of time. This shift has occurred in the context of a historical vogue for 'transnationalism,' that is, capturing experiences that traversed and transcended the borders of nation-states both within and beyond the European world. The work of the diplomatic historian Akira Iriye has been central to these developments, illuminating the (...) traces of a distinctively twentieth century history of 'cultural internationalism' that resonated through the realms of politics. Following in the footsteps of Iriye and others--including feminist and pacifist historians who had long engaged the internationalist past--a new cohort of international historians, often sensitive to cultural analyses and with expertise in imperial and transnational as well as national histories, are now accruing broad-ranging evidence of the geographies of internationalism and the political and economic reach of its various strands at critical moments in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Motivational internalism is roughly the view that moral judgement necessarily involves some degree of motivation to act morally. Kantian and non-Kantian scholars in general agree that Kant is committed to motivational internalism. However, in the recent literature some contemporary Kantians have defended a form of motivational internalism that, given Kant’s theory of motivation and rational agency, he cannot possibly hold. I argue that in order to clarify the nature of Kant’s motivational internalism, we need to consider the main features of (...) Kant’s theory of motivation and rational agency. I show that, although it is not often recognised, Kant is in fact committed to two different internalist claims. The conclusion of the paper is that Kant’s motivational internalism is of a different kind than the one discussed in current debates of metaethics. (shrink)